Oak Ridge Nuclear Cavitation Confirmation

July 27, 2013 – By Steven B. Krivit –

This is Part 10 of “2001 Oak Ridge Nuclear Cavitation Confirmation Uncovered.”

This is a New Energy Times Special Report. The first part of this series published on July 18, 2013.

Shapira and Saltmarsh Stand by Their Data (March 2002)
The day the Taleyarkhan group’s paper published, March, 8, 2002, journalist Charles Seife, on the news side of Science, reported Saltmarsh’s speculation about the excess neutrons.

“One possibility [for the excess neutrons] is that the extra neutrons are left over from the 14-MeV neutrons fired into the cylinder,” Seife wrote, “eventually winding up in the detector after skittering about the room. To rule out that scenario, says Saltmarsh, he and Shapira timed the flashes of light from the bubbles and compared them with the arrival times of the extra neutrons. The effect disappeared.”

The question of coincidences was moot, as West explained later in an e-mail to New Energy Times.

“The flaw in Seife’s logic is so obvious,” West wrote. “The number of neutrons would be the same whether there was cavitation or not, whether the acetone was deuterated or not, and whether the acetone was at 20 degrees C or at 0 degrees C. Seife apparently didn’t understand the significance of our control experiments.”

Peter Weiss, writing for Science News on March 9, 2002, cited the Shapira and Saltmarsh document (Ref #31) and the Taleyarkhan group’s rebuttal (Ref #32). Weiss gave the last word to Saltmarsh, who countered the Taleyarkhan group’s rebuttal with a single sentence.

“Not so fast,” Saltmarsh counters. “We stand by our data.”

Shapira and Saltmarsh Submit Comment to Science (March 2002)
In fact, the Taleyarkhan group stands by the Shapira and Saltmarsh data, too. But the Taleyarkhan group did not fight the battle in the media. It did not seem to understand the role of science media in communicating its work to the public. It did not seem to understand the effort it would take to correct facts and public myths once the first impressions took hold. These were hard lessons for the Taleyarkhan group.

After Shapira and Saltmarsh promoted their Web-published document and spoke widely to the media about their unreviewed critique, they submitted a formal scientific comment to Science.

Katie Pennicott, writing in the April 2002 issue of Physics World, reported the forthcoming Shapira and Saltmarsh journal comment. Pennicott reported that Shapira and Saltmarsh had attempted their own replication.

“Shapira and Saltmarsh are now preparing two reports for Science that outline the technical shortcomings of Taleyarkhan’s original work, and give a fuller account of their own attempts to reproduce it,” Pennicott wrote.

On March 28, Shapira and Saltmarsh submitted their comment to Science. Science immediately sent the comments to the Taleyarkhan group, which submitted its reply three weeks later, on April 15. Science accepted the Shapira and Saltmarsh comments three months later, on July 2, and accepted the Taleyarkhan group’s reply on Aug. 19. The two papers published back to back on Sept. 6.

The Shapira and Saltmarsh comment raised questions about neutron/tritium ratios, detector efficiencies and coincidences and concluded, “These inconsistencies cast serious doubt on the claimed evidence for D-D fusion in these experiments.”

In its paper, the Taleyarkhan group responded to the “serious doubts” raised by Shapira and Saltmarsh.

Shapira and Saltmarsh Submit Comment to PRL (July 2002)
On July 17, two weeks after Science accepted Shapira and Saltmarsh’s comment, they submitted a paper to Physical Review Letters. The PRL paper published remarkably fast — 33 days after PRL received it, on Aug. 19, 2002. If Pennicott’s information, “now preparing two reports for Science,” was correct, then this PRL paper may have been the second report Shapira and Saltmarsh originally prepared for Science.

Shapira and Saltmarsh’s PRL paper was on a faster track than their comment to Science. Their PRL paper published before the comment and reply in Science on Sept. 5. Taleyarkhan, the corresponding author of the March 8, 2002, Science paper, was not offered a chance by PRL to submit a paper to go along with the Shapira and Saltmarsh PRL paper.

By July, when Shapira and Saltmarsh submitted their paper to PRL, many news reports had stated that they had attempted their own replication, and the idea had begun to take hold in the public’s mind. The Taleyarkhan group had remained silent.

Shapira and Saltmarsh Make Replication Claim in PRL (August 2002)
They began their PRL paper with the phrase, “We have repeated the experiment of Taleyarkhan et al.” as they had done in the Feb. 20 and March 1 documents, and they directly titled their paper an attempted replication: “Nuclear Fusion in Collapsing Bubbles – Is It There? An Attempt to Repeat an Experiment That Reported D-D Fusion in Bubble Collapse Induced by Cavitation in Deuterated Acetone.”

In the Feb. 20, 2002, and March 1, 2002, documents, even though Shapira and Saltmarsh started out with the phrase “We have repeated the experiment,” they also wrote in the papers that “the cavitation apparatus was operated by the original authors,” that is, the Taleyarkhan group.

That’s not what they wrote in the PRL paper. Shapira and Saltmarsh rephrased the sentence: “The operating condition of the cavitation apparatus was set by the authors of Ref. [6] to be identical to that used in their experiment.”

The content of the PRL paper is mostly the same as the Feb. 20, 2002, and March 1, 2002, documents with one major exception: Shapira and Saltmarsh speculated about background neutrons.

The authors knew that both the ETD and the PD neutron data showed excess neutrons, even statistically significant excess neutrons. They knew that their data had inadvertently confirmed, not disconfirmed, the Taleyarkhan group’s claim. For these reasons, in the PRL paper, Shapira and Saltmarsh knew they could not write that they had seen “no evidence for any excess neutrons,” as they had told the press and the ORNL science writers in March.

Instead, they addressed two possibilities, neither of which they tested. The first was that the intensity of the PNG varied during experiments. This would mean that the intensity of the PNG, by chance, varied directly when cavitation was on or off, when deuterated acetone was used or normal acetone was used, and when the apparatus was chilled to 0 degrees C or not.

Their second explanation is “possibly a change in neutron scattering geometry due to people in the area being at different positions for the two runs.”

Taleyarkhan wrote to New Energy Times and explained what would be required if Shapira and Saltmarsh’s explanation were valid.

“In order for room-return background neutrons to bounce off of us to create such an effect,” Taleyarkhan wrote, “either JaeSeon or I (Shapira mostly remained seated) would have had to be running three feet toward and then three feet away from the test cell every 25 microseconds at speeds of 1,000 m/s to 10,000 m/s constantly for the entire hour. This is ridiculous, besides being impossible. And, of course, their conjecture would have required us to sit still for the entire hour during the run with cavitation off.”

This was the third alternative hypothesis that Shapira proposed.

Next Part: Shapira Confirms He Did Not Perform a Replication

Oak Ridge Nuclear Cavitation Confirmation

July 25, 2013 – By Steven B. Krivit –

This is Part 8 of “2001 Oak Ridge Nuclear Cavitation Confirmation Uncovered.”

This is a New Energy Times Special Report. The first part of this series published on July 18, 2013.

Oak Ridge Issues Press Release (March 4, 2002)
On March 4, 2002, ORNL issued its press release about the forthcoming Taleyarkhan group’s Science paper. The press release led off with the tritium data. The neutron results, however, reflected the earlier incorrect information from Shapira and Saltmarsh.

“Attempts to confirm these results by looking for the telltale neutron signature of the deuterium fusion reaction have yielded mixed results,” the ORNL press release says. “While there are indications of neutron emission in the newly published results, subsequent experiments with a different detector system show no neutron production.”

Bob Park’s newsletter, along with this incorrect information in the press release, made a widespread impact. To restate the problem, the ORNL science writers failed to understand the distinction between measurement of neutron singles counts and measurement of neutron/SL flash coincidences.

Despite the fact that the Taleyarkhan group explained in its rebuttal that Shapira and Saltmarsh’s own neutron data, taken with the PD detector, confirmed the excess neutron production, the ORNL press release didn’t reflect this information.

The press release said that Lee Riedinger, ORNL’s deputy director for Science and Technology, said that the “results suggest the need for additional experiments.”

“In particular,” the release quoted Riedinger, “the difference in the two sets of neutron measurements must be clarified.”

At that time, the erroneous perception that Shapira and Saltmarsh had performed their own independent experiments was not widespread, thanks to the following correct information in the ORNL press release: “The second set of [neutron] measurements was performed with the cooperation of the authors in their laboratory.”

The context of the sentence made clear that the measurements were performed in the Taleyarkhan group’s lab.

The Conflict Goes Public (March 5, 2002)
Kenneth Chang talked with Saltmarsh and reported the news the next day in the New York Times.

“This is an intriguing idea,” Saltmarsh said. ”It’s a bit off the wall. But that experiment does not support that it does happen.”

Saltmarsh told Chang that ”it’s easy to be fooled” and that the “researchers were detecting random particles from the background, not the product of fusion.”

Saltmarsh suggested that the excess neutron counts seen only during the test runs and not the control runs were attributable to random particles. This was the second alternative hypothesis.

Unlike Park, Chang had access to the Taleyarkhan group’s rebuttal and knew about the dispute over the two sets of neutron measurements. Chang wrote that, although “the number of neutrons was about 1 percent higher, the emissions did not coincide with the flashes of light.”

Chang quoted Saltmarsh, who went beyond what he had carefully written in his and Shapira’s paper.

”We see no evidence for any excess neutrons,” Saltmarsh said.

Saltmarsh knew that was not what the Taleyarkhan group’s data said. And he knew that this was not what his and Shapira’s own data said.

“Using a different detector from the laboratory,” Chang wrote, “the physicists, Dan Shapira and Michael J. Saltmarsh, found no sign of the telltale neutrons that would be emitted by fusion.”

Chang wrote accurately that Shapira and Saltmarsh had only used an independent detector, rather than performed an independent experiment. Journalist Charles Seife, writing for the news side of Science, on March 8, 2002, however, reported the Shapira and Saltmarsh work as their own experiment.

“But other scientists,” Seife wrote, “citing another Oak Ridge experiment that seems to belie the claim, are likening the paper to cold fusion.”

Seife introduced his own easy-to-follow yet erroneous interpretation of Shapira and Saltmarsh’s conclusion.

“They concluded that Taleyarkhan’s results had been an illusion,” Seife wrote.

Seife wrote, “Taleyarkhan and colleagues dispute Saltmarsh’s interpretation of the data and are posting the details of their objections on the Web.”

In a 2008 book he wrote, Seife explained the nuclear cavitation conflict as a breakdown of the peer-review process. But in the case of the Taleyarkhan group’s paper, the journal side of Science abided by and succeeded with the peer-review process. Seife, however, did not do his part as a journalist in respecting the peer-review process.

Seife prominently featured Shapira and Saltmarsh’s paper — published only on the ORNL Web site — which had not been peer-reviewed. More than that, he did not inform readers that the critique from Shapira and Saltmarsh was published on the Web only and was not peer-reviewed. Furthermore, Seife omitted facts from the Taleyarkhan group which were available at the time and published on the Web.

Shapira and Saltmarsh later submitted a formal comment to Science, which did get peer-reviewed. But that took place months later, long after Seife’s story. Even though Seife spoke with Taleyarkhan in 2007, in Seife’s 2008 book he included no comments from the Taleyarkhan group about the Shapira and Saltmarsh paper.

Next Part: The Half-Truth of Shapira and Saltmarsh’s 1 Percent

Oak Ridge Nuclear Cavitation Confirmation

July 23, 2013 – By Steven B. Krivit –

This is Part 6 of “2001 Oak Ridge Nuclear Cavitation Confirmation Uncovered.”

This is a New Energy Times Special Report. The first part of this series published on July 18, 2013.

Science Accepts Taleyarkhan Group’s Paper (January 2002)
On Jan. 30, 2002, Science accepted the Taleyarkhan group’s paper and scheduled it for publication on Feb. 14.

The acceptance, however, triggered another round of internal conflict. ORNL management asked Science to delay publication to allow time to sort it out.

Around this time, ORNL management asked Taleyarkhan to include Shapira as a co-author of the forthcoming Science paper.

“Something – I don’t know what – happened in January that resulted in ORNL management’s request of me to include Shapira as co-author,” Taleyarkhan wrote. “I had to go along with their instructions. But I could not speak for RPI nor for RAS.”

Approximately Feb. 1, after conferring with his group, Taleyarkhan told ORNL management that his group gave a resounding “no” to the idea of including Shapira as a co-author. Shapira and Saltmarsh protested further.

Oak Ridge Gives Final Clearance (February 2002)
In an attempt to resolve the conflict, ORNL management scheduled a review meeting, which took place on Feb. 19, 2002. Riedinger, Roberto, Taleyarkhan, Block, Lahey, Shapira, Saltmarsh and three or four external advisers from universities attended. The advisers included R. Gil Gilliland, associate director of the Energy and Engineering Sciences Directorate at ORNL, William Bugg, research professor at Stanford University and former head of the Physics Department at the University of Tennessee, and Kirby Kemper, head of the Physics Department at Florida State University.

During the meeting, Shapira and Saltmarsh expressed their objections to the Taleyarkhan group’s pending publication in Science.

“Riedinger led the meeting. He accepted the tritium evidence as compelling and referred to that as the smoking gun. He recommended placing that evidence first in the results section, followed with the findings related to neutrons-gammas, followed by the SL,” Taleyarkhan wrote.

“Nigmatulin was convincing with his theoretical foundations,” Taleyarkhan wrote. “Jack Harvey, an internationally recognized pioneer in nuclear instrumentation at ORNL, in advance of the meeting, had reviewed and confirmed the neutron-gamma pulse-shape discrimination and detection system and protocols. Murray’s testimony on tritium and his independent vetting of the tritium data and itsmode of acquisition and analysis persuaded all the people in the room that, although there was room to improve the neutron-gamma monitoring aspects together with SL coincidences, the crux of the necessary evidence (neutrons, tritium and accompanying theoretical foundation) was sufficient such that ORNL would, as an institution, stand behind us.”

Block recalled the meeting, in an e-mail to New Energy Times.

“I commented on the detector that Shapira and Saltmarsh used and pointed out that it was really much too large for an accurate measurement and that it could have suffered from electronic overload (dead time loss) that led to a reduced signal rate. There were neutral – as far as I know – visitors from universities who listened to our arguments and recommended that ORNL go forward with our Science publication. We were pretty cordial with each other, and I left with the feeling that we achieved our objective: ORNL would not block this publication.”

West recalled the meeting, in an e-mail to New Energy Times.

“Shapira was forced to agree, in response to questions from Block, that the neutron scintillation detector that we used was the optimum size for such measurements, whereas the MUCH larger one Shapira had used was not optimal,” West wrote. “When, it appeared to me, the advisers were leaning in favor of publication of our Science paper, Roberto left his seat, walked around to Riedinger, who was sitting at the head of the table, and said something to him privately and returned to his own chair with no further comment.”

But Shapira and Saltmarsh negotiated a deal with ORNL management and the Taleyarkhan group. Shapira and Saltmarsh would get to include their objections in a document that would be listed as a reference in the Taleyarkhan group’s Science paper. The reference would provide a link to Shapira and Saltmarsh’s document on the ORNL Web site.

Shapira and Saltmarsh Circulate Their Objections (February 2002)
Shapira and Saltmarsh had their draft document ready the next day, and they began distributing it.

With the tritium confirmed by internal peer review, and the neutron singles confirmed by both the ETD detector and the PD detector, Shapira found a new objection to the claim, as Taleyarkhan told New Energy Times.

“After Shapira was forced [by our analysis of his raw data] to recognize the positive neutron data,” Taleyarkhan wrote, “he and Saltmarsh included the positive neutron data in their Feb. 20, 2002, document, but with a second twist. They wrote that their neutron data did not match our measured tritium data.”

“Any excess neutron production,” Shapira and Saltmarsh wrote, “was at least three orders of magnitude less than that required to explain the tritium production rate reported in Ref. 1 as being due to D-D fusion.”

It was a haphazard way of comparing a neutron-to-tritium ratio because Shapira had not taken data for tritium analysis the day he came to measure the Taleyarkhan group’s neutrons.

The Shapira and Saltmarsh paper, which was not peer-reviewed, published only on the ORNL Web site and was listed in the Taleyarkhan group’s Science paper as reference #31. Reference #32 was the Taleyarkhan group’s rebuttal to reference #31. It, too, was not peer-reviewed. Lahey published #32 on the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute Web site.

Although Shapira and Saltmarsh’s Feb. 20, 2002, document hadn’t been published on the ORNL Web site or peer-reviewed, it stirred up the physics community.

Two of the most prominent nuclear physicists in the U.S. went out of their way to try to get Science editor Donald Kennedy to block the Taleyarkhan group’s pending paper, as he later wrote. The first was Richard Garwin of IBM, famous for his work in the U.S. nuclear weapons program. The second was William Happer, the head of Princeton University’s fusion laboratory and a former director of the Department of Energy’s Office of Science.

Science journalist Charles Seife, on the news side of Science, was covering the developing story. Years later, looking back, here’s how he described the moment.

“I was convinced,” Seife wrote. “Taleyarkhan was wrong: Bubble fusion was a fiction. And because of the spurious result, a scientific drama was playing out before my eyes. The officials at Oak Ridge felt that the Shapira-Saltmarsh [document] was damning, and they were hoping to avoid embarrassment.

“Garwin and Happer were trying to prevent another cold-fusion controversy, and Kennedy was trying to preserve the integrity of the peer-review process. Rumors were flying, and they were getting nastier and more paranoid by the minute. Everybody was getting increasingly annoyed with everyone else.”

Park Reports News of Shapira and Saltmarsh’s Document (March 2002)
On March 1, 2002, a week before the Taleyarkhan group’s paper published (the same date as the final version of the Shapira and Saltmarsh document), Robert Park scooped the science journalists and broke the news. At the time, Park was the director of public information at the Washington office of the American Physical Society, and he published a newsletter that effectively went to the entire U.S. physics community.

Park cited text only from the Shapira-Saltmarsh document. He began by saying that the Taleyarkhan group’s work was wrong because Shapira and Saltmarsh failed to successfully repeat it.

Park’s statement included several inaccuracies and significant omissions.

“The experiment [was] repeated by two experienced nuclear physicists,” Park wrote, “D. Shapira and M.J. Saltmarsh, using the same apparatus, except for superior neutron detection equipment.

“They found no evidence for 2.5 MeV neutron emission correlated with sonoluminescence. Any neutron emission was many orders of magnitude too small to account for the tritium production reported by the first group.”

Next Part: Taleyarkhan Group Responds to Shapira and Saltmarsh